The country of Bosnia and Herzegovina is embroiled in a crisis that may affect its political future and the stability of the western Balkans. Recent events in the bitterly divided country read a little like a spy novel. But the tensions that threaten three decades of tenuous peace since the region was torn apart by ethnic strife in the 1990s are only too real.

On February 26, 300 armed Hungarian police officers in civilian clothes crossed into Republika Srpska without approval from the Sarajevo state government. Republika Srpska is one of the two territorial entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Hungarian police were there, ostensibly, to train local police.

But they were reportedly sent to be ready to extract Republika Srpska president, Milorad Dodik, who had the same day been convicted by a Bosnian court for “separatist actions”. These included suspending rulings of the Bosnian constitutional court and refusing to publish decisions by the Bosnian high representative, which prevents them from becoming law in contravention of Bosnia’s constitution.

He was sentenced to 12 months in prison and handed a six-year ban from all political activities. Within days of the verdict, Dodik reacted by banning all Bosnian state prosecutorial, police and court institutions from Republika Srpska, in what the Bosnian constitutional court ruled was a move to “effectively abolish state authority over part of its territory”.

In March, Bosnia’s state court issued an arrest warrant against Dodik for ignoring a court summons over his alleged secessionist activity. In April, the Bosnian state investigation and protection agency, Sipa, attempted to arrest him in East Sarajevo, which is part of Republika Srpska.

An armed stand-off followed between Sipa officers and local police. Eventually the Sipa officers withdrew.

So it came as a surprise for many when Dodik and his lawyer attended a scheduled hearing for his case on July 4. The court duly lifted its arrest warrant pending further proceedings with a requirement that he report in on a periodical basis.

Two days later, despite only being on conditional release, Dodik restated his claim for the unification of Republika Srpska with Serbia, saying: “Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a state of Serbs but only a temporary refuge.”

The burden of history

The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged from the horrors of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. The country’s political form was part of the 1995 Dayton peace agreement, which was both a peace deal and a state-building blueprint.

To accommodate, rather than solve, the tensions between the three main ethnic groups – Bosniak Muslims, Serbs and Croats – the state was divided into two entities: the Serb-majority Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Both parts of the country hold considerable autonomous powers, but are bridged by the weak federal political institutions. Like many power-sharing deals, Dayton ended the fighting but failed to build an integrated state.

The two entities guard their autonomy fiercely. Attempts by the European Union to push for constitutional changes to pave the way to closer relations with the Bosnian state, for example by reforming the country’s police force, have been rebuffed by nationalist politicians.

The Republika Srpska has been vocal in defence of its autonomous rights. And the most prominent voice among them has been Dodik, who consistently portrays Republika Srpska as a bulwark for Serbs against a hostile Bosnian-majority state imposing its will.

Serbs only account for about 30% of the total population of Bosnia, and clearly chafe at the power-sharing arrangement. Ever since the Dayton accords brought a halt to the fighting, Serb nationalist politicians have toyed with the idea of a “Greater Serbia”.

This encompasses Serbs living in Serbia, Republika Srpska and Serbia’s breakaway province in Kosovo. Dodik’s statement from July 6 has stirred up these sentiments once more, almost to the day on the anniversary of the first-ever pan-Serbian assembly held in Belgrade on June 8 2024 and co-hosted by Dodik and and the Serbian president, Aleksandar Vučić.

At a crossroads

Bosnia is at a crossroads. Internally divided in whether populations see their future in their past, retaining a semi-autocratic, ethno-nationalist government, or whether they see their future as a democratic, accountable and multiethnic state. The former, of course, would look to – and remain within the sphere of influence of – Russia. The latter prefer to look westward for their future.

Bosnia, like its neighbours, is an EU candidate country. It began accession negotiations in March 2024, but many of the reforms required to meet EU accession criteria clash with Bosnia’s constitution.

Among other things, this restricts who can join the tripartite federal presidency and the House of Peoples, the upper-chamber of the federal parliament, excluding Jews, Roma and other minorities. This would have to change for Bosnia to join.

But the Bosnian constitution is anchored in the Dayton peace agreement, so nationalist politicians threaten that constitutional reform will endanger Bosnia’s peace and integrity.

Embracing constitutional reforms to fulfil EU entry requirements is risky for nationalist politicians as it undercuts their ethnic powerbase. However, turning fully away from the EU, and possibly towards Russia, carries a hefty price-tag in foregone direct financial support and economic integration. So far, Dodik and Vučić have managed to somewhat balance these seemingly contradictory courses of action. However, they are facing increasing headwinds.

Both the ongoing Serbian protests and recent polls from Bosnia showing that 70% of Bosnians (but only 50% of Bosnian Serbs) want to join the EU, question whether this course remains viable. With increased popular calls for democracy, accountability and fair elections, the recent actions by Dodik and his allies may be a reaction to these demands, rather than a separate agenda.

An old elite desperately clinging to power? Given the political fragility of Bosnia, reform appears inevitable. But the choice is a contested one.

One way the country breaks into its constituent parts along ethnic lines. The other prospect is that Bosnia embraces reform and progresses to become a democratic multi-ethnic state with a European future. Either way may spell turbulent times ahead.

Birte Julia Gippert does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.