In the latest attempt to crack down on irregular migration, the UK government has announced a raft of international sanctions against people smugglers. The sanctions will use asset freezes, travel bans and other financial restrictions to go after businesses and individuals thought to be facilitating smuggling operations.

The government has committed to treating irregular migration as a national security threat, to be tackled with tools drawn from the counter-terrorism playbook. But, given the supply and demand forces that drive the smuggling industry, sanctions may not be effective.

Smuggling is, essentially, a service industry. Opportunistic entrepreneurs charge migrants a fee to enable them to cross borders they wouldn’t otherwise be able to.

These operations rely on wide networks: suppliers of dinghies and vehicles, informal money transfer brokers, local guides skilled at avoiding detection. While the routes and logistics vary across regions, empirical research consistently shows that smuggling is usually low-skill and fragmented. It’s rarely the domain of organised, mafia-style cartels.

This regime of sanctions and asset freezes adds a new tactic to a familiar policy toolbox. Previous Conservative governments and EU countries have treated smuggling as a form of organised crime that can only be defeated through security responses. They’ve invested in surveillance, border walls and policing at home and internationally. Evidence suggests this approach is not only ineffective – it can backfire.

Why sanctions may miss the target

Smugglers and migrants alike operate in highly hostile environments. Evading detection and minimising risk is essential. This has made migrant smuggling particularly adaptable to criminal justice responses.

Take money transfers between migrants and smugglers. Smuggling fees are often handled through the informal “hawala” money transfer system. A migrant deposits funds with a broker in the departure country, who holds the money and issues a code. Only once the migrant has safely arrived at their destination is the code released to a second broker, who then pays the smuggler. Debts between hawala brokers are settled when future operations move money in the opposite direction.

Hawala money transfers are legal in most countries. But as no funds cross borders directly, this type of informal banking lends itself well to transactions that are anonymous and untraceable. The UK’s new sanctions target hawala brokers involved in handling payments between smugglers and their clients. But, in the same way that the structures of smuggling groups have evolved and adapted in response to police or border enforcement, so will their systems to move money safely.

Follow the money: the new sanctions take aim at the business of smuggling.
Andrzej Rostek/Shutterstock

On heavily policed borders such as those in the Balkans, small-scale smugglers, often migrants themselves, have formed more coordinated groups bonded by ethnicity or language. Many of the groups listed in the UK sanctions, such as the Kazawi and Tatwani groups, have been on Interpol’s radar for years.

Even when key figures are arrested, these groups have demonstrated the ability to disband and regroup on a different border. Sometimes they go quiet while developing new strategies, only to resurface in the same areas, driven by unchanged demand in smuggling services. Hawala brokers hit by the new sanction regime are likely to close and restart operations under different names.

How effective can UK sanctions be if the targets and their assets are not in the UK, and if their operations can quickly shift across borders and names? Unless other countries follow suit and enforce similar measures, these sanctions may amount to little more than politically symbolic.

Supply and demand

So long as migration policy focuses almost exclusively on “smashing the gangs” and targeting the supply side of irregular migration, smugglers and other entrepreneurs involved in facilitating it are likely to reinvent themselves and find new, more precarious ways to circumvent border restrictions.

Unless implemented internationally, UK sanctions will do little to change this. But international counter-smuggling responses are highly dependant on the specific circumstances faced by the states involved.

In Italy, right and left-leaning governments have pursued an anti-mafia approach to smuggling for years, with limited results. Earlier this year, Italian authorities arrested suspected trafficker Osama Elmasry Njeem, following a warrant by the International Criminal Court on charges of murder, rape and torture.

They then released him and repatriated him to Libya, sparking a row with the ICC. Although Italy has made deals with with the Libyan government in Tripoli to stop irregular migrant boats, it appears there were concerns that his arrest could strain relations with Libyan counterparts and trigger a surge in boat arrivals from North Africa. This situation highlights the challenges that can arise with such tactics.

The idea that cracking down on smugglers, through sanctions or criminal justice responses, will deter people from seeking their services is not supported by evidence. If anything, it increases the risks migrants must take, making journeys more dangerous but no less likely. Migration flows to Europe rise and fall in patterns driven far more by global instability and lack of legal alternatives than by changes in law enforcement.

Including smugglers in a sanctions regime may create headlines, but it misses the bigger point: people smuggling exists because people need to move. It is a demand-led phenomenon, and it is the demand side – why people turn to smugglers in the first place – that remains largely unaddressed.

To reduce the power and appeal of smugglers, governments need to open safe, legal pathways for migration. This would reduce reliance on illicit networks, protect vulnerable people and restore order to a system that is politically defined by routine crises.

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David Suber received funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council for his PhD in 2020-2024.